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Introduction 
When Donald Trump was elected President of the United States inNovember 2016, the world was concerned about how he wouldput into practice the many radical foreign policy ideas that he
had proposed during the presidential campaign. Given Trump’s hawkish
rhetoric toward China, observers paid special attention to how he would
change Sino-American relations and how Chinese President Xi Jinping would
respond. The result of such dynamics will have far-reaching implications for
the world. This paper sets out to review Sino-American relations and to as-
sess the challenges and opportunities for China in the areas of national se-
curity, economic development, and regional as well as global governance
in the early days of Trump’s presidency in which new rhetoric and uncer-
tainties overshadow American foreign policy.
Sino-American relations: Between
cooperation and competition
Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Beijing
government allied with the Soviet Union and labelled the United States an
“imperialist force” that endangered its existence in the early period of the
Cold War. When Sino-Soviet relations turned sour in the 1960s with the
military clash in 1969, the Beijing government and the US Government en-
tered into rapprochement and normalised relations in 1979. (1) Subsequently,
the US ceased recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) under its “One-
China” Policy but continued to maintain non-diplomatic relations with the
island under the Taiwan Relations Act.
After the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Sino-American relations reached
a nadir. Deng Xiaoping proposed the principle of “hiding the light and
cultivating one’s strength” (tao guang yang hui韬光养晦) to guide China’s
foreign policy at the time. In the 1990s, part of the tension in Sino-Amer-
ican relations came from China’s human rights record and US trading
privileges for China. After heightened tension resulting from the US
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the two countries
continued to engage with each other. In 2001, China became a member
of the World Trade Organization with US approval, and they were also
drawn into closer cooperation against global terrorism after the 9/11 at-
tacks. As China’s comprehensive national power continued to grow from
then on, the rhetoric of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi 和平崛起) became
dominant in China’s foreign policy discourse, and its national interests
also expanded from the regional to the global sphere. Meanwhile, China
was encouraged by the US to make a greater contribution to global sta-
bility as a means of gaining international recognition as a “responsible
power.” (2)
After Xi Jinping became China’s leader in 2012, there was a change in
foreign policy succinctly characterised by the phrase “striving for achieve-
ment” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为). (3) In addition to being an international
norm-taker, China also strived to be a norm-shaper. (4) For example, Xi an-
nounced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) and the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative in 2013. Moreover,
China took a more active role in shaping the rules that regulate cyberspace
with the notion of “cyber-sovereignty.” (5) With regards to Sino-American
relations, Xi proposed a “New Mode of Major Country Relationship” be-
tween the two powers, which underlines the principle of “non-conflict,
non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.” (6) The US,
however, has only accepted such a relationship in part, and its competition
with China intensified under the Obama Administration. Since 2011, the
US has practiced a “Pivot to Asia” policy and has emphasised its military
and economic dominance in Asia. One of its manifestations was the US-
proposed free trade agreement called the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP),
which deliberately excluded China’s participation. It reinforced a prevalent
view in China that the grand strategy of the US in Asia was to contain
China’s rise. (7) Cooperation on specific issues such as climate change has
nevertheless been noticeable, and the joint effort of the two countries
made the Paris Agreement possible in 2015. (8) In short, Sino-American re-
lations could be characterised as between cooperation and competition,
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with a practical mix of trust and mistrust. While China is an indispensable
power for the US to engage with in trade, global security, and climate
change, it also faces frictions with the US on many issues such as territorial
assertion, human rights, cyberespionage, currency valuation, etc. (9)
President Trump and uncertainties for China
During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump took advantage of exist-
ing Sino-American tensions to castigate China for manipulating its currency,
pursuing an imbalance of trade with the US, stealing manufacturing jobs
from the US, fabricating the hoax of climate change, etc. (10) He also vowed
to put “America first” and to “make America great again” by opposing mul-
tilateral free trade and reducing America’s international obligations. While
it is not uncommon for a president-elect to back down on electoral
promises, Trump proved to be an outlier in this regard. However, Trump’s
determination to realise his non-mainstream views of foreign policy under
the catchword “peace through strength” is facing domestic hurdles. For in-
stance, Trump’s National Security Council (NSC) and economy-related
agencies are manned with people who share his views but also those who
do not, hinting at the possibility of foreign policy incoherence. The difficulty
Trump had getting the Republican-controlled Congress to approve the trade
representative for China he nominated (11) also indicates a potential rift be-
tween the White House and Congress and to some extent within the Re-
publican Party. Moreover, Trump himself appears to disregard many
conventions in international relations and behaves unpredictably when it
comes to foreign affairs, as exemplified in the first Xi-Trump Summit in April
2017, during which Trump ordered a surprise airstrike against Syria’s gov-
ernment forces over the latter’s use of chemical weapons in its civil war. (12)
Sino-American military conflicts in Asia
unavoidable?
Before Trump’s presidency, tension had already been building up in East
Asia over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Soon after the independence-
leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained both the presidency and
legislative dominance in Taiwan for the first time in May 2016, its refusal
to recognise the “1992 Consensus,” which regards Taiwan as part of “One
China,” deepened the mistrust between Beijing and Taipei. In response, Bei-
jing ceased official cross-strait talks with the Taipei government and actively
circumscribed its international space. (13) There was no shortage of hawkish
statements from the mainland side warning of military force in the event
of Taiwan moving toward independence. (14) The fact that Trump had a phone
conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his presidential
victory also invited speculation about a change in America’s “One-China”
policy, although the US reaffirmed its adherence to the policy soon after-
ward. (15)
In the meantime, the South China Sea also became an object of Sino-
American contention when Beijing claimed sovereignty over the area and
started to militarise it, while Washington emphasised “the right of innocent
passage” of military vessels and contained China through warship deploy-
ment. (16) The 2016 ruling of the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which technically re-
jected China’s territorial claim over the South China Sea, was largely re-
garded by China as an American plot. (17) Meanwhile, periodic outbursts of
nationalism within China, on both the street and the Internet, occur when-
ever China comes into conflict with foreign countries. Regardless of the
causes for such phenomena, Xi himself also exhibited nationalistic inclina-
tions in his rhetoric of the “China Dream” and “the rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese nation.” These make compromise on Taiwan and the South China Sea
as China’s identified “core interests” less likely.
Moreover, China’s military expenditure grew from 79.8 billion USD in 2005
to 215 billion USD in 2015 (around 2% of GDP throughout the decade). (18)
Specifically, China has been strengthening the People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) to protect its maritime trade and energy security. (19) The
steady rise in China’s military strength has caused uneasiness among neigh-
bouring countries, leading them to invite the US to counter-balance China’s
military power in Asia. (20) Simon Shen from the Chinese University of Hong
Kong has pointed out that one of Xi’s foreign policy goals is to be the re-
gional power in Asia where Asian people run affairs for themselves. (21) Xi’s
rhetoric intends to reduce the influence of the US as the current regional
power in Asia while not being regarded as culturally Asian. Given the Sino-
American competition for regional dominance in Asia, observers have dis-
cussed whether the two countries will inevitably fall into the “Thucydides
Trap” in which a new rising power is likely to enter into military conflict
with the hegemonic power. (22) The general consensus is that neither China
nor the US could rationalise going to war with the other.
At the onset of Trump’s presidency there was discussion about whether
the US would withdraw from Asia and isolate itself under the “America First”
policy. Shi Yinhong from Renmin University argues that Trump would be less
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likely to oppose China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and else-
where due to the inconsistent policies the Trump Administration made at
home and the turbulence Trump brought to America’s traditional alliances.
He suggests this would give China some additional strategic opportuni-
ties. (23) Other observers, however, warn of continued US containment of
China, although in a way different from that of the Obama Administration.
Shen Dingli from Fudan University argues that Trump’s pragmatism could
make US military strategy more aggressive than under his predecessor if Xi
fails to reach a consensus with Trump on trade frictions. (24) Ruan Zongze
from the government-affiliated China Institute of International Studies con-
tends that Trump continues to see Asia as a strategic focal point, and that
his vision for the US in Asia is to ask American allies to bear greater respon-
sibility rather than to withdraw the US completely from the Asia-Pacific. (25)
Even if the US keeps its presence in Asia, observers argue that military
conflict between two countries remains a slight possibility under the Trump
Administration. For one thing, domestic nationalism in China might not
pose as great a danger as it seems to foreign policy-making. Zha Wen from
the China Foreign Affairs University points out that despite nationalistic
protests at home, the mainstream middle class in China holds a more tol-
erant view of globalisation and less anti-foreign sentiment as they are ben-
eficiaries of China’s opening to the world. (26) Also, Andrew Nathan from
Columbia University observes that China’s policymakers have been prudent
and pragmatic in using nationalism for foreign affairs in the past. (27) In the
shadow of intra-party factional struggle and economic problems at home,
Xi has no reason to engage the US in military conflict. It is also in the in-
terest of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not to lose its focus on sus-
tainable economic growth as an effective tool for remaining in power. In
this light, the adoption of the “Thucydides Trap” in Chinese foreign policy
discourse (28) is a genuine reflection of the CCP’s effort to avoid military con-
flict with the US. 
Meanwhile, the US is unlikely to wage war with China over Taiwan or the
South China Sea despite the hawkish rhetoric of the Trump Administration.
For one thing, Amitai Etzioni from George Washington University argues
that China is of value to the US in achieving other more important objec-
tives, and picking a military conflict with China is very low in the US
agenda. (29) Also, the military technology gap is not large enough for the US
to be assured of a decisive victory in a military conflict with China, prompt-
ing Tao Wenzhao from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to argue
that any radical alteration of the current peaceful Sino-American relations
is not an option for the US. (30)
Sino-American trade war in the making?
Observers then turn to the possibility of a trade war between China and
the US, as Trump virtually vowed to start one during the presidential cam-
paign. While economic measures against China were not implemented im-
mediately after his assumption of office, Trump did prepare to find
solutions to reduce America’s trade deficits with China and other coun-
tries. (31) Trump’s picks of key trade personnel also indicate his intention to
adopt a tougher stance toward China over trade friction. However, as both
China and the US are among each other’s top five trading partners and ex-
port markets, their high level of economic interdependence prompts most
scholars to conclude that a trade war between the two would hurt both
sides substantially. Also, many cast doubts on whether the US would
emerge the ultimate winner in a trade war with China. Given the Chinese
state’s ability to control its domestic economic market, Keyu Jin from the
London School of Economics and Political Science contends that the Chi-
nese government could inflict greater harm to the US economy by coor-
dinating its economic retaliation measures more precisely, costing
American jobs where Trump vowed to create more. (32) As an alternative to
a full-scale trade war, the Trump Administration might initiate trade con-
frontation in selected sectors, with the steel industry very likely to be one
of the targets. (33)
There are some less confrontational measures that could reduce trade
friction between the two countries. For example, China could remove pro-
tectionist measures such as tariffs for American goods and restrictions on
American investment in the Chinese market. China could also re-balance
bilateral trade by purchasing more high technology from the US and boost
investment in the US to help Trump create more jobs. (34) However, the
fuzzy linkage between the government and private enterprises in China
often sparks national security concerns in the US when Chinese investors
acquire American firms with sensitive technologies. Some evidence sug-
gests that China’s investment in the US will face even more congressional
scrutiny under Trump’s presidency. (35) As such, while a full-scale trade war
is more unlikely than the rhetoric suggests, trade frictions are inevitable
amidst deep-seated Sino-American mistrust, and Trump may continue to
hone in on the issue of trade imbalance as a bargaining chip to pressure
China for concessions in other areas, as shown in his negotiation with China
for deterrence of North Korea’s nuclear program after the first Xi-Trump
Summit. 
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Regional and global governance: China for
leadership?
Observers are paying attention to whether Trump will uphold the US’s
leadership role in many aspects of world affairs and whether China will have
the interest, capabilities, and sufficient soft power to take up that role in
the event of a US retreat.
Regarding regional economic cooperation, Geoffrey Gertz from the Brook-
ings Institute notes that Trump hopes to replace multilateral trade agree-
ments with numerous bilateral deals. He analyses Trump’s strategy as likely
to be highly inefficient, as it ignores the fact that supply chains for many
products have already become globalised, with stages of production taking
place in multiple countries. Also, smaller countries find themselves better
off under the multilateral framework, as they can form coalitions to offset
the power imbalance with major powers such as the US. (36) For this reason,
talks on the realisation of the TPP have continued among interested coun-
tries following the US’s departure, which also allows China greater leeway
to shape regional economic rules. China might join the TPP talks and com-
plete the negotiations in the absence of US opposition, or it might push to
finalise its own regional free trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has lower standards for labour protec-
tion and intellectual property rights than the TPP. (37)
In global governance, the Trump Administration has exhibited reluctance
to uphold some important international commitments such as human
rights protection across the world as well as at home. (38) US ambiguity in
defending human rights will surely relieve pressure on China regarding its
human rights record. This could make China’s development model, which
emphasises stability over human rights, more attractive globally, and in turn
embolden China to further suppress calls for better protection of human
rights at home and democratisation in places where it enjoys special influ-
ence such as Hong Kong. (39) The “China Model” may even be more actively
promoted, as Xi shows a growing interest in “guiding international society”
with China’s own version of international order. (40)
At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, Xi deliberately
seized the moment to advocate the merits of economic globalisation in re-
sponse to the rise of alt-right nationalism and populism in the US and Eu-
rope. His speech, which proposed a “China Solution” to the pressing issues
of the world today, also portrayed China as a potential candidate for global
leadership (41) and brought Xi surprising media acclaim. (42) Similar to China’s
official view, John Dickenson from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
praised Xi for taking responsibility for safeguarding the international public
good and for establishing a new discourse emphasising cooperation for mu-
tual benefit. (43) Some Chinese scholars also suggest that China should be
more active in promoting a new Sino-centric international order with “rule
by Chinese virtues” (wangdao) instead of “rule by Western coercive force”
(badao). (44) Such endeavours for ideological and cultural justification of
China’s new role in the international community should nevertheless be
subject to further scrutiny about how China lives up to those values empir-
ically abroad and at home. Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign
Relations on the other hand cautions against rapid embrace of China’s qual-
ifications as a defedner of globalism. She argues that China’s restrictive poli-
cies on the flow of goods, capital, and information make it far from a
“champion of globalisation” at this moment. (45) Jean-Pierre Cabestan from
Baptist University of Hong Kong also questions whether Western countries
would follow China’s proposal of a state-controlled rather than society-
based international order, and suggests that America’s global leadership
could experience resurgence with the eventual departure of Trump, as its
political system is more resilient than China’s in maintaining military and
economic power. (46)
With regards to climate change, the looming possibility that the US will
not honour the Paris Agreement has brought China and the European Union
closer together to fill the leadership void. (47) Nicholas Stern from the London
School of Economics and Political Science believes that China has the ca-
pacity to be a leader on this front due to its constant effort in promoting
sustainable energy. (48)
The US commitment to global security is less evident since Trump’s pres-
idency, causing some eyes to shift to China. However, while China is cur-
rently the third largest contributor to the UN budget and second largest to
the UN peacekeeping force, (49) it is doubtful whether China is both willing
and able to contribute to global security. On the issue of non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons, while both China and the US adopt the same rhetoric,
Luo Xi from the Academy of Military Science of China points out that
China’s scope of focus is less extensive than that of the US and is largely
restricted to North Korea due to its geopolitical importance. North Korea’s
continued nuclearisation over the past years has also exposed the deficiency
of China’s policy toward this issue. (50) Even if China’s leaders want to be
more active in this role, the potential overstretching of China’s current do-
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mestic strength for such tasks calls for a careful re-consideration. (51) Joseph
Nye from Harvard University also warns that overestimation of China’s role
in providing global security might repeat the mistake made in the interwar
period, when the US bound itself to isolationism and the United Kingdom
was unable to play such a role, ultimately leading to a disastrous out-
come. (52)
Conclusion
With Trump’s determination to bring about the radical changes he envi-
sions and the unpredictability of US foreign policy filled with new rhetoric,
it is hard to predict the future of Sino-American relations. Room for both
competition and cooperation co-exist. In the areas where competition is
inevitable, ensuring that miscalculation does not prevail is of importance.
In the Sino-American competition for Asian dominance, Trump’s hawkish
rhetoric, even if not realised at the end, could push more hawkish elements
within China such as the People’s Liberation Army to gain greater weight in
forging foreign policy. (53) The result could put China, the US, and Asian coun-
tries in a “security dilemma” that no country rationally desires.
Meanwhile, the Trump Administration’s unpredictability in foreign affairs
could increase miscalculations for its Chinese counterpart. As the rhetoric of
Western interference in China’s domestic affairs has been frequently de-
ployed to justify the tightening of domestic control since the Xi Administra-
tion, China’s miscalculation of the US security policy might arouse greater
suspicions about the US’s “ulterior motives” toward China. There could be
some unintended consequences. For one thing, it could unnecessarily reduce
the Sino-American exchanges that have been beneficial to China’s socio-
economic development. Also, it would sustain Beijing’s hard-line policies to-
ward Taiwan and Hong Kong, where historical relations with the US have
always complicated Beijing’s strategies toward the two places, and where
local resistance to China’s increasing encroachment is already evident. Mis-
taken assessment of the threat they pose to China’s national security could
backfire on China’s long-term policy to win the hearts and minds of the local
populace and further foment anti-China sentiments there.
On the economic front, if Sino-American trade friction seems unavoidable
given domestic politics in the US and Trump’s diplomatic strategies, greater
US pressure on China is not necessarily negative, as it could help China re-
consider the setbacks of its heavy trade imbalance with the US and to lever-
age external stimuli to push ahead with necessary economic reforms
currently blocked by domestic vested interests or by Chinese officials ob-
sessed with China’s new international status and resistant to new ideas
from the outside world. (54) As the Chinese writer Lu Xun once said, Chinese
people opt for moderate reform in the face of revolutionary change. If you
want to open a window against the darkness, you are likely to be rejected,
but if you say you want to remove the rooftop for light, you will get the
window opened. (55)
Moreover, in the event of a US retreat from global leadership, China’s
greater cooperation with other countries on climate change and regional
free-trade frameworks could enhance China’s political influence by filling
the leadership vacuum in those multilateral discussions. Nevertheless,
China’s unilateral use of trade, investment, and its domestic market as for-
eign policy tools to punish other countries for perceived violation of its “core
interests” could undermine the faith of other countries in China’s qualifica-
tions to become a global leader.
Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether China is willing to take a more
active role in global security such as nuclear non-proliferation and global
terrorism beyond its national interests, and whether it is capable of mus-
tering sufficient support from the international community, where prevalent
values and norms are sometimes at odds with those upheld in China. 
Lastly, despite all the rhetoric of Sino-American competition in the early
days of Trump’s presidency, it is certainly possible that the two countries
could enter a period of greater cooperation through a number of “grand
deals” between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump by favouring pragmatism over
idealism in guiding foreign affairs and turning zero-sum competition into
positive-sum cooperation. In the short-term, reduction in Sino-American
competition is likely to afford China a balance of power favourable for its
continued projection of power in Asia and beyond. 
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